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Article 
Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal 
Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the 
Financial Crisis 
Steven M. Davidoff† 
The federal government struggled mightily to rescue the 
financial system during the panic of fall 2008. The govern-
ment’s hurried, frenetic response can be described as “regula-
tion by deal,” a term David Zaring and I coined to explain the 
ad hoc process by which the Federal Reserve, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury (Treasury Department) attempted to rescue 
failing financial firms and resolve the market crisis within the 
limits of their legal power.1 When the government concluded its 
dealmaking, it was left an unwilling holder of debt and equity 
interests throughout the financial sector. For good measure, it 
also owned sizable equity stakes in two of the country’s three 
largest automotive manufacturers.  
The structure of this ownership was a product of the Treas-
ury Department’s “regulation by deal” approach. The Treasury 
Department did not use any single template. Instead, each new 
rescue and deal brought different ownership terms and models. 
The government effectively nationalized Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac; took controlling equity interests in General Motors 
(GM), GMAC, and American International Group, Inc. (AIG); 
acquired noncontrolling equity and debt interests in Citigroup 
and Chrysler; and purchased nonvoting preferred securities in 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Ar-
ticle was prepared for, and presented at, the University of Minnesota Law Re-
view Symposium, “Government Ethics and Bailouts: The Past, Present, and 
Future.” Copyright © 2011 by Steven M. Davidoff. 
 1. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Gov-
ernment’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2009); 
see also STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, 
GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION (2009).  
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the 707 banks that received Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) funds. In each case, the acting government agency uti-
lized different mixtures of common, preferred, and debt securi-
ties, and negotiated divergent corporate governance terms. The 
agencies arranging this assistance also failed to maximize the 
economic and legal terms of each investment in its origination 
when measured against what a private sector participant 
would likely have negotiated.  
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations repeatedly pro-
fessed unease with this ownership. The Obama Administration 
was the more vocal of the two. In a series of memos and pro-
nouncements, the Obama Administration disavowed any social-
ist or corporatist intent. The Administration publicly set forth 
the following principles: (1) the federal government acquired 
these ownership stakes solely due to the exigent circumstances, 
(2) would adopt a hands-off approach in monitoring its invest-
ments, and (3) would seek to dispose of these investments as 
soon as practicable.2 These principles were sometimes formal-
ized in agreements with invested companies.3 Yet again, both 
the Bush and Obama Administrations took different approach-
es to implement these principles depending upon the invest-
ment.  
The Bush and Obama Administrations’ frenetic responses 
raise the more fundamental issue of how the government 
should actually structure its investments. Must the govern-
ment structure its investments as a commercial shareholder—
on arms-length, commercial terms? Alternatively, should it rec-
ognize the inherently political nature of such ownership and at-
tempt to limit undue political influence through a voluntary 
cession of control? If so, what is the appropriate measure of 
control the government should retain? Regardless of its in-
vestment model, to what extent should market terms dictate 
the government’s investment?  
 
 2. See Press Release, The White House, Obama Administration Auto Re-
structuring Initiative, General Motors Restructuring (Mar. 30, 2009) [here-
inafter Press Release, General Motors Restructuring], available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-on-Obama-Administration-Auto 
-Restructuring-Initiative-for-General-Motors; Press Release, Written Testimo-
ny of Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, Do-
mestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Com-
mittee (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press 
-releases/Pages/tg453.aspx. 
 3. See infra Part II.A.  
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This Article tackles these questions.4 It draws early lessons 
from the government’s corporate ownership during the finan-
cial crisis and develops principles to guide the structure, moni-
toring, and retention of future investments. Part I sets forth 
the different models of government ownership during the fi-
nancial crisis, highlighting the Treasury Department’s regula-
tion-by-deal approach to ownership.5  
Part II assesses the government’s ownership experience 
and provides a near-term critique of the corporate governance 
structures the government utilized. These programs lost rela-
tively small sums compared to the economic harm averted. This 
success was in part due to the Bush and Obama Administra-
tions’ preinvestment structuring principles that relied on com-
mercial norms to set the terms of these investments. Still, the 
Treasury Department—the government agency primarily re-
sponsible for these investments—left money on the table by 
failing to negotiate full commercial terms and by repeatedly 
spurning opportunities to acquire substantial equity stakes in 
its investments. The Treasury Department also unduly for-
feited significant post-investment control over these invest-
ments in order to limit future political influence. It instead re-
lied on soft-control mechanisms such as independent directors 
and their willingness to heed the government’s wishes due to 
corporate social norms. These mechanisms had value, but we 
do not and may not ever definitively know their true worth; 
their impact is difficult to calculate and the facts of the inner 
workings of the structures have yet to be disclosed.  
The limits of soft control were never fully tested due to the 
timely market upturn that salvaged the government’s invest-
ments. In this light, the Bush and Obama Administrations’ 
failure to negotiate a level of ultimate control in many cases 
appears to have been an error, though one for which the gov-
ernment did not have to pay the consequences. My criticism is 
quite directed. Control comes in all shapes and sizes, and in 
this context, when I refer to ultimate control, I mean the ability 
to remove and replace a majority of directors at some time in-
 
 4. For articles looking at the issue of government ownership from the 
shareholder perspective, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Gov-
ernment Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 409 (2010), and J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes 
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287 (2010). 
 5. For another cogent analysis of government ownership, see Barbara 
Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the 
Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561 (2010).  
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terval. This fallback level of control together with softer govern-
ance forces would have provided the government all the control 
it likely needed, while actually giving it a control mechanism in 
case soft and other governance forces did not succeed. But the 
government was so skittish about any level of control that it 
forfeited even this fundamental investor right.  
The final part of this Article draws on the analysis in Part 
II to offer some lessons for future government corporate owner-
ship. The ultimate lesson of government ownership during the 
financial crisis is that such constructs are inherently unstable 
given U.S. citizens’ current political attitudes toward public 
ownership of private enterprise. Understanding beforehand 
what the goals of such ownership are and having a holistic view 
of societal wealth maximization can lead to the creation of bet-
ter corporate structures to govern such ownership and more ef-
fectively maximize these investments. United States govern-
ment corporate ownership will remain quite rare. When it does 
occur, however, the government should adhere to these general 
goals while adopting the mantra of a commercial investor as 
the starting point for its investments. No other model is likely 
to have as much legitimacy.  
The lessons of the financial crisis also point to flexibility in 
such ownership structures. Simply advocating the private equi-
ty model may not be sufficient when a back-door influence 
model can work in a similar manner with greater overall politi-
cal effectiveness. This jibes with the practical reality that fu-
ture government ownership is likely to adopt similarly hetero-
geneous patterns as each crisis is its own unique entity shaped 
by political, market, and legal realities. In other words, each 
crisis brings its own form of “regulation by deal” that drives the 
ownership structures the government devises. Because each 
crisis will be different, any set ownership rules are likely futile, 
leaving us with basic principles to rely upon—principles which 
assume future flexible implementation. This insight ultimately 
informs academic theory on firm governance, illustrating that 
no single model alone can explain or is appropriate for all cor-
porate governance arrangements. 
I.  THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP   
This Part outlines the structure of government ownership 
in its various forms through the financial crisis. The govern-
ment’s investments were not only numerous, but heterogeneous 
in form and structure. This Part sets forth the terms of each 
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significant investment and also outlines the corporate govern-
ance terms the government negotiated in each case.  
A. AIG 
The government began its ownership experience with Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac (together, the government-sponsored 
enterprises or GSEs). However, these were quasi-public enti-
ties, which were effectively nationalized. The federal govern-
ment only truly embraced private ownership when it acquired a 
controlling interest in AIG amidst the financial panic of 2008. 
Financial assistance to AIG was patterned on a failed, private 
rescue effort for the company as well as the government’s prior 
investment in the GSEs.6 But this time the government was 
much more circumspect about acquiring full control or elimi-
nating the private nature of a corporate enterprise.  
The keystone of the federal government’s initial assistance 
was an $85 billion loan extended by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.7 The interest rate was 8.5 percent over the Lon-
don Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 8.5 percent on un-
drawn funds and a commitment fee of $1.7 billion.8 These loan 
terms were initially based on private sector terms, but the Fed-
eral Reserve later eased them as AIG continued to decline fi-
nancially. The Treasury Department would subsequently au-
thorize additional assistance up to $69.8 billion under the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).9 Ulti-
 
 6. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009). 
 7. AIG, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter AIG 
2008 September Form 8-K], available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
5272/000095012308011496/y71452e8vk.htm. This loan was subsequently re-
duced to a maximum amount of $60 billion. See AIG, Current Report (Form 8-
K) (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/ 
000095012308013926/y72249e8vk.htm; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/other/20081110a.htm. For a more in-depth analysis of the 
AIG bailouts, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 943 (2009). 
 8. See Credit Agreement exhibit 99.1, Sept. 22, 2008, between American 
International Group, Inc. and Federal Reserve Bank of New York [hereinafter 
AIG 2008, exhibit 99.1], available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/ 
000095012308011496/y71452exv99w1.htm; see also Matthew Karnitschnig et 
al., U.S. to Take over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as 
Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html. 
 9. Hugh Son, AIG Rescue Cost Narrows by $2.9 Billion, U.S. Says, BUS. 
WK., May 21, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-21/aig-rescue 
-cost-narrows-by-2-9-billion-u-s-says-update2-.html. 
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mately, the government would authorize up to $182.3 billion in 
direct assistance through these and other programs.10 
In connection with the origination of the initial $85 billion 
loan, AIG also issued to the Federal Reserve preferred securi-
ties equivalent to a 79.9 percent voting and dividend interest in 
AIG.11 These shares were convertible into AIG common stock 
upon the amendment of AIG’s certificate of incorporation to 
permit this conversion.12 The ownership interest would later be 
reduced to a 77.9 percent interest (with a 79.77 percent voting 
interest) when, in connection with a TARP investment, the 
Treasury Department was issued a warrant equivalent to two 
percent of AIG’s common stock.13  
Like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG also left outstand-
ing in public hands a 20.1 percent effective interest in its equi-
ty.14 The reason for this outstanding interest was not an-
nounced, but it was likely attributable to perceived and actual 
budgetary and legal limitations.15 The AIG common stock re-
mained in public hands and traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE). AIG even performed a reverse stock split to en-
sure that its stock continued to qualify for listing on the NYSE 
under its listing standards.16 The trading in AIG stock rose to 
such volumes that the Wall Street Journal subsequently char-
acterized it as a “casino,” with people placing uninformed bets 
on whether AIG’s equity was worthless or not.17 
 
 10. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-475, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: UPDATE 
OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 13 (2010), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10475.pdf. 
 11. AIG 2008, exhibit 99.1, supra note 8.  
 12. Id.  
 13. AIG, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter AIG 
2008 November Form 8-K], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/5272/000095012308016447/y72888e8vk.htm. The government’s use of 
preferred stock in this and other circumstances is reviewed in Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise in the United States: 
Their Genesis in and Effects on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transac-
tions, 40 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1489–505 (2010).  
 14. See AIG 2008, exhibit 99.1, supra note 8. 
 15. The ownership level was kept below eighty percent in order to prevent 
AIG’s liabilities from being consolidated onto the federal government’s balance 
sheet.  
 16. Frequently Asked Questions, AIG, http://www.aigcorporate.com/ 
investors/rev_split_faqs.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2011). 
 17. See Susan Pulliam & Tom Lauricella, Traders Seek Fortune in AIG, 
Stock Once Left for Dead, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125366502247832417.html (“AIG, arguably, has 
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The AIG preferred securities issued to the Federal Reserve 
were subsequently placed into an irrevocable trust for the bene-
fit of the Treasury Department.18 The Federal Reserve ap-
pointed three trustees to administer the trust.19 The trust in-
strument provided the trustees with complete power to vote 
and dispose of the government’s shares.  
The government effectively ceded control over both its 
ownership interest and AIG by placing its shares into this 
trust. The government also narrowly directed the trustees to 
operate the company with a view toward repaying amounts 
owed to the government.20 The only other management direc-
tion was to not disrupt the financial markets.21 These were 
light touches and an almost complete cessation of control. The 
Federal Reserve maintained a measure of control through its 
loan agreements, although the covenants here were similar to 
those applicable to a credit-worthy borrower rather than the 
more lengthy covenants contained in the high-yield debt that 
AIG would now be required to provide in the private market—if 
it could even raise debt.22 The Treasury Department also re-
tained the right under the terms of its preferred shares to ap-
point two directors to the board if AIG missed dividend pay-
ments on the preferred shares for four consecutive quarters.23 
AIG did indeed miss these payments, and on April 1, 2010, the 
Treasury Department appointed independent, retired corporate 
executives.24 Meanwhile, at AIG’s 2010 shareholder meeting, 
the trustees directly recommended five directors to AIG’s elev-
 
been the biggest casino of all. In the past seven weeks, its common shares 
have careened between $13 and $55, surging past $54 on Tuesday before clos-
ing at $45.80.”). 
 18. See AIG, Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 10.1 (Jan. 16, 2009) [here-
inafter AIG Trust Agreement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/5272/000095012309001128/y74153exv10w1.htm. 
 19. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding Es-
tablishment of the AIG Credit Facility Trust (Jan. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/an090116.html. 
 20. AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Government Investment, Role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the Trustees, AIG, http://www 
.aigcorporate.com/GIinAIG/role_trustees.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2011).  
 23. AIG 2008 November Form 8-K, supra note 13.  
 24. See James Sterngold & Rebecca Christie, AIG Board Grows with Two 
New Directors Named by U.S., BUS. WK., Apr. 1, 2010, http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-01/treasury-to-name-layton-rittenmeyer-to-aig 
-board-update1-.html. 
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en-member board with the remainder being recommended by 
the AIG board itself.25 
After the deposit of the preferred shares with the trust, the 
only remaining direct control the government exerted over AIG 
was through the executive compensation requirements admin-
istered by special master Kenneth Feinberg.26 Behind the 
scenes, though, the government still exerted real control. It is 
still unknown whether AIG’s board or executives directly 
spurned any government request. But both the board and top 
executives were repeatedly replaced at the behest of either the 
Federal Reserve or the Treasury Department.27 News reports 
gave the impression that the Treasury Department still 
wielded great day-to-day authority, and the Assistant Treasury 
Secretary for Financial Stability regularly met with AIG execu-
tives, including AIG’s chief executive officer.28  
The government thus operated AIG in a queasy vacuum. 
AIG was to be a private company but the government’s owner-
ship brought political considerations into its operating deci-
sions. Its quasi-public nature often left the public wondering 
about the measure of control the government asserted. At times 
it also affected employee morale.29 Meanwhile, it was an open 
question about how this ambiguity affected the day-to-day per-
formance of the company and its ability to create value for its 
largest stakeholder, the federal government.  
On September 30, 2010, AIG announced an agreement 
with the Treasury Department to restructure these invest-
 
 25. AIG: Where Is the Taxpayers’ Money Going? Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Governmental Reform, 111th Cong. 122–23 (2009) 
(statement of Douglas L. Foshee) [hereinafter AIG: Where Is the Taxpayers’ 
Money Going], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg53019/ 
pdf/CHRG-111hhrg53019.pdf. 
 26. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Special Master 
for TARP Executive Compensation Issues First Rulings (Oct. 22, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg329.aspx. 
 27. See, e.g., Andrew Clark, Outgoing AIG Chief Gives Up $22m Payoff, 
GUARDIAN, (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/22/ 
insurance.marketturmoil (“Willumstad was told to step aside in a phone call 
made personally by the treasury secretary, Henry Paulson.”). 
 28. See, e.g., AIG: Where is the Taxpayer’s Money Going, supra note 25, at 
13 (statement of Edward M. Liddy, Chairman and CEO, AIG) (noting that offi-
cials of the Treasury Department regularly met with AIG executives to discuss 
the company’s business). 
 29. Richard Beales et al., A.I.G. Needs A.I.A. Deal Soon, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2010, at B2, available at 2010 WLNR 11918633. 
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ments to facilitate a disposition of the government’s positions.30 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York would be repaid the 
approximately $46 billion it was owed. While $20 billion would 
come from asset sales, approximately $22 billion would come 
from newly borrowed TARP funds.31 The remainder of the 
proceeds used to repay the government would come from asset 
sales by AIG.32 If the restructuring is completed on these 
terms, only the Treasury Department would maintain an inter-
est in AIG in the form of a number of series of preferred stock.33 
The parties have also agreed that this preferred stock would 
subsequently be repaid by asset sales, including the sale of 
AIG’s interest in Asian insurer AIA.34 In connection with this 
restructuring, the other outstanding preferred shares in the 
amount of $49.1 billion would be converted into common shares 
of AIG, comprising 92.1 percent of the company.35  
AIG also announced that the AIG Trust would be liqui-
dated upon completion of this restructuring and that the Treas-
ury Department would directly hold this 92.1 percent inter-
est.36 The Treasury Department did not agree to any 
restrictions on its ability to appoint directors—such as a re-
quirement that they be independent. This was a remarkable 
turn. Not only had the Treasury Department surpassed the 
eighty percent threshold in terms of ownership, it no longer ac-
tively sought to restrict its control rights.  
B. CITIGROUP 
The government’s investment in Citigroup also evolved as 
the financial crisis continued and the bank’s financial state de-
teriorated. On October 14, 2008, the Treasury Department an-
nounced that it would purchase $25 billion worth of preferred 
securities in Citigroup under the TARP Capital Purchase Pro-
gram (CPP).37 This investment was part of the government’s 
$125 billion initial TARP investment in the country’s nine larg-
 
 30. Press Release, AIG, AIG Announces Plan to Repay U.S. Government 
(Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.aigcorporate.com/newsroom/2010_ 
September/AIGAnnouncesPlantoRepay30Sept2010.pdf. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. AIG 2008 exhibit 99.1, supra note 8.  
 34. Press Release, supra note 30. 
 35. AIG 2008 September Form 8-K, supra note 7.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Floyd Norris, Another Crisis, Another Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 
2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 22496172. 
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est financial institutions.38 Subsequently, and in order to recap-
italize Citigroup, the Treasury Department was forced to twice 
rework its investment and provide further assistance under the 
TARP Targeted Assistance Program.39 The Treasury Depart-
ment eventually exchanged $12.5 billion worth of TARP pre-
ferred securities for Citigroup common stock.40 The exchange 
was first announced on February 27, 2009 during the final days 
of the Bush Administration.41 After this exchange concluded on 
September 10, 2009, the Treasury Department owned approx-
imately 7.7 billion shares of Citigroup common stock, $27.059 
billion in preferred securities, and warrants to purchase 465.1 
million shares of Citigroup common stock.42  
The Treasury Department also became the largest share-
holder of Citigroup with a 33.6 percent ownership interest upon 
the completion of this exchange.43 Unlike its stake in AIG, the 
government did not place this ownership position into an irre-
vocable trust. An official at the Treasury Department would 
later assert that the reason for the difference was that the 
EESA prohibited such a trust arrangement.44 This interpreta-
tion was a stretch, however, as the law did not directly address 
 
 38. Id.  
 39. See Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 27, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000095010309000421/ 
dp12698_8k.htm. 
 40. See Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.9 (July  
23, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/0000 
95012309024819/y78424exv99w1.htm (“Citi Completes Exchange Transaction 
with Private Holders and U.S. Government Matching Exchange”). 
 41. Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi to Exchange Preferred Securities for 
Common, Increasing Tangible Common Equity to as Much as $81 Billion (Feb. 
27, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090227a.htm. 
 42. Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Citigroup 2009 February Form 10-K], available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.htm. 
 43. See Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi Announces Shareholder Ap-
proval of Increase in Authorized Common Shares, Paving Way to Complete 
Share Exchange (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/ 
press/2009/090903a.htm (“Upon completion, the U.S. government will own 
7,692,307,692 shares, or 33.6 percent of outstanding shares.”).  
 44. See Troubled Asset Relief Program, The U.S. Government Role as 
Shareholder in AIG, Citigroup, Chrysler, and General Motors and Preliminary 
Views on Its Investment Management Activities, Testimony Before the Sub-
comm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
111th Cong. 18 (2009) (statements of Orice Williams Brown, Director of Fi-
nancial Markets and Community Investment, and A. Nicole Clowers, Acting 
Director of Physical Infrastructure) [hereinafter GAO Testimony], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10325t.pdf. 
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the issue. More likely, criticism of the government’s actions 
with respect to AIG had made the Treasury Department more 
wary of forfeiting its ownership interest.  
Despite the Treasury Department’s retention of ownership, 
the government still contractually limited its control rights. 
The Treasury Department agreed with Citigroup that it would 
vote its shares in proportion to all other shares cast except for 
certain designated matters, which included “the election and 
removal of directors.”45 Even then the Treasury Department 
never publicly nominated or removed any directors to the Citi-
group board or otherwise acted in a forthright manner to exer-
cise these reserved rights. After the conclusion of the exchange 
offer, the only crisis-originated power the government asserted 
upon Citigroup was with respect to the executive compensation 
requirements under the TARP.46 This authority was removed 
on December 23, 2009, when Citigroup redeemed $20 billion in 
outstanding preferred securities held by the Treasury Depart-
ment.47  
The government again wielded significant soft and indirect 
power outside of its formal arrangements—primarily exercised 
through its ability to oversee the company under its bank su-
pervisory powers.48 In addition, members of the Treasury De-
partment were briefed on Citigroup’s major decisions and 
helped to select new board members.49 Here, as with AIG, poli-
ticians also repeatedly acted to assert the government’s owner-
ship position by way of financing to pursue their own political 
endeavors.50 For example, one widely quoted article in the New 
 
 45. Exchange Agreement exhibit 10.3, June 9, 2009, between Citigroup, 
Inc. and United States Department of the Treasury [hereinafter Citibank 2009 
Exchange Agreement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
831001/000119312509128765/dex103.htm. 
 46. See GAO Testimony, supra note 44, at 3. 
 47. Citigroup 2009 February Form 10-K, supra note 42. 
 48. See Eric Dash, Citi Is Urged to Replace Its Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 581479.  
 49. Deborah Solomon & David Enrich, U.S. to Take Big Citi Stake and 
Overhaul the Board, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at C1, available at http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB123570659457790823.html?KEYWORDS=take+big+ 
Citi+stake+and+overhaul+the+board (“[T]he government is demanding that the 
New York company overhaul its board of directors, the people said. Treasury 
will call for Citigroup’s board to be comprised of a majority of independent 
directors.”).  
 50. See Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Worth?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2010 (Magazine), at 32, available at 2010 WLNR 84978 (discussing 
specific examples related to Senator Barney Frank and others). 
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York Times Magazine detailed how individual Congress mem-
bers exercised significant authority over the company.51  
The Treasury Department contractually committed to dis-
pose of Citigroup’s common stock by the ten-year anniversary 
of the exchange offer’s completion.52 It would not take that 
long.53 On December 14, 2009, Citigroup announced that the 
government intended to sell its stake over the following six to 
twelve months.54 The first sale took place on April 26, 2010,55 
and by December 2010 the Treasury Department had disposed 
of its entire interest—an investment that ultimately realized a 
$12 billion gain.56  
C. GM AND CHRYSLER 
The government provided financial assistance to GM and 
Chrysler in two stages.57 In the first stage, it provided suffi-
cient financing for the companies to operate through the transi-
tion from the Bush to the Obama Administration.58 Under the 
TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program, GM and 
Chrysler received loans from the Treasury Department of $13.4 
billion and $4 billion, respectively.59 In both instances the Bush 
Administration extended the loans under the assumption that 
they would not be sufficient for the continued operation of the 
company.60 Under the terms of each loan, each company was 
 
 51. Id. (highlighting Senator Barney Frank’s and other members of Con-
gress’s attempts to influence Citigroup’s compensation plans for their  
executives). 
 52. Citibank 2009 Exchange Agreement, supra note 45, exhibit 10.3. 
 53. See Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 (Dec. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/0000950123 
09070361/y80976exv99w1.htm. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See David Lawder & Maria Aspan, Treasury Begins Sale of Citigroup 
Stake, REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/04/26/us-citigroup-treasury-idUSTRE63P4KD20100426. 
 56. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Pric-
ing of Citigroup Common Stock Offer (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www 
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/TG995.aspx. 
 57. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY 
FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 35 [hereinafter OFS FINANCIAL 
REPORT 2009], available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational 
-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/OFS%20AFR%2009_24.pdf. 
 58. See David Cho & Lori Montgomery, Bush Prepares Request for Rest of 
Bailout Funds, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp 
-dyn/content/article/2009/01/09/AR2009010902846.html. 
 59. OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 57, at 102–03. 
 60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-553, AUTO INDUSTRY: 
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required to develop a plan for “financial viability” for the Oba-
ma administration to consider by February 17, 2009.61 
In the second stage, after the presidential transition, the 
Obama Administration decided to provide significant additional 
financial assistance to both companies.62 The full background 
behind the decision to provide additional assistance to the two 
automakers has yet to be publicly disclosed, but it appears to 
have been based on two fundamental assumptions. First, the 
Automotive Task Force headed by Steven Rattner and head-
quartered in the Treasury Department concluded that the 
overall costs of liquidating the automakers would be greater 
than providing assistance.63 Second, the Treasury Depart-
ment’s investment was based on the assumption that each of 
the automakers would be able to function independently after 
their restructuring.64 With respect to the latter decision, some 
 
SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AND AUTOMAKERS’ RESTRUCTURING TO 
DATE 2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09553.pdf. 
 61. See id. at 2 (discussing the GM and Chrysler loan programs); General 
Motors Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 31, 2008) [hereinafter GM 
2008 December Form 8-K], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/40730/000095015209000103/k47265e8vk.htm (detailing GM’s loan agree-
ment); Loan and Security Agreement, Dec. 31, 2008, between General Motors 
Corporation and U.S. Department of the Treasury [hereinafter GM 2008 Loan 
Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/Posted%20%20 
Contract%20-%20GM%20Original%20Loan%20and%20Security%20Agreement% 
20with%20amendments%2009-09-09.pdf; Loan and Security Agreement, Dec. 
31, 2008, between Chrysler Corporation and U.S. Department of the Treasury 
[hereinafter Chrysler 2009 Loan Agreement], available at http://www 
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Documents_ 
Contracts_Agreements/Chrysler%20LSA%20as%20of %2005-26-10.pdf. 
 62. Between these two stages, another $6.36 billion in loans would be ex-
tended to GM, including $361 million for a warranty program and $280 mil-
lion in loans to Chrysler for a similar warranty program. CONG. OVERSIGHT 
PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE 
SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 9–
10 (2009) [hereinafter COP REPORT]. 
 63. See JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE: PRESIDENT OBAMA, YEAR ONE 
183 (2010) (“With 225,000 employees, 500,000 retirees, 11,500 suppliers and 
6,000 dealers, liquidation was never an option.”); STEVEN RATTNER, 
OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 
EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 52–53 (2010). 
 64. See RATTNER, supra note 63, at 53; Obama Administration New Path to 
Viability for GM & Chrysler, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www 
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Documents_ 
Contracts_Agreements/autoFactSheet.pdf (last visited March 23, 2010) (“While 
GM’s current plan is not viable, the Administration is confident that with a 
more fundamental restructuring, GM will emerge from this process as a 
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in the Administration doubted the Automotive Task Force’s 
conclusion as to the viability of Chrysler.65 The viability conclu-
sion for Chrysler thus appears to have been driven by political 
and macroeconomic considerations regarding the effects of its 
collapse on state economies.66  
To achieve these goals, the Automotive Task Force ulti-
mately decided to restructure each of these entities through use 
of the § 363 sale provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.67 Its use of 
this procedure was quite novel and controversial.68 To ensure 
that there were minimal legal challenges to this device, the Au-
tomotive Task Force brokered significant compromises with 
unsecured and secured lenders as well as other stakeholders, 
including employees.69 This approach affected the terms of the 
actual ownership position the government took in each entity.70 
In order to ensure a quick bankruptcy process and viable post-
bankruptcy companies, the Treasury Department converted a 
large portion of its initial investments from debt to equity.71 
The post-bankruptcy ownership of GM is set forth in the 
following diagram: 
 
stronger more competitive business . . . . Chrysler has reached an understand-
ing with Fiat that could be the basis of a path to viability.”). 
 65. Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout: How We Did It, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 
2009, at 55 (describing the characterization of government intervention as 
“creeping socialism” in the eyes of some observers). 
 66. See RATTNER, supra note 63, at 120–23; Rattner, supra note 65, at 55, 
61 (elaborating on some of the “hard hit” communities that could potentially 
shoulder most of the burden associated with a collapse of the automotive 
industry).  
 67. See Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2010) (elaborating on the government’s deci-
sion to use § 363 as a tool in the restructuring of Chrysler). 
 68. See id. at 729 (“The Chrysler bankruptcy process used undesirable 
mechanisms that federal courts and Congress struggled for decades to sup-
press at the end of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries 
. . . .”); Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., May 13, 
2009, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124217356836613091 
.html. But see Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in 
Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 532 (2009) (suggesting that this use of a 
§ 363 sale is “entirely within the mainstream of chapter 11 practice for the last 
decade”). 
 69. Roe & Skeel, supra note 67, at 733–34. 
 70. See COP REPORT, supra note 62, at 19–20. 
 71. See id. For details on the terms set forth, see generally Master Trans-
action Agreement, Apr. 30, 2009, between Fiat S.p.A., New CarCo. Acquisition 
LLC, Chrysler LLC, and the Other Sellers Identified Herein, available at http:// 
www.ohiopracticalbusinesslaw.com/uploads/file/Chrysler%20Purch%20Agmt% 
281%29.pdf. 
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72 
Unsecured creditors received a ten percent stake in GM 
plus warrants to purchase an additional fifteen percent owner-
ship interest; the UAW Retiree Medical Benefit Trust (UAW 
Trust) received a seventeen percent stake plus a warrant to 
purchase 2.5 percent of the new company; the Treasury De-
partment received a sixty-one percent stake; and the govern-
ments of Canada and Ontario received a twelve percent owner-
ship interest.73 The Treasury Department also received debt 
and preferred securities worth $9.2 billion and extended a loan 
of up to $30.1 billion.74 
The post-bankruptcy ownership of Chrysler is set forth in 
this diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72. These figures assume that the warrants issued by GM are not exercised. 
See Gen. Motors Co., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 18, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/1467858/000119312510192195/ 
ds1.htm.  
 73. COP REPORT, supra note 62, at 20–21. 
 74. Id.  
10%
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Government
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The Treasury Department received a ten percent owner-
ship stake in Chrysler; the governments of Canada and Ontario 
received a two percent ownership stake; Fiat received a twenty 
percent ownership interests with a right to raise its stake up to 
thirty-five percent of the company upon its achievement of cer-
tain milestone events; and the Chrysler Voluntary Benefit Em-
ployment Association received a sixty-eight percent stake. The 
Treasury Department also extended a new loan in the amount 
of $8.5 billion to the post-bankruptcy Chrysler.75  
In both cases the Treasury Department maintained direct 
ownership of these interests and did not deposit them into a 
trust.76 The Treasury Department also contractually agreed to 
forego direct control over each company.77 The Treasury De-
partment limited its right to appoint directors in a stockholder 
agreement to ten of the twelve directors in the case of GM.78 
However, the agreement required that two-thirds of the board 
be comprised of independent directors. After July 10, 2009, any 
new members appointed by the government were required to be 
independent.79 Any subsequent directors would be appointed by 
these independent directors and not the government, though 
the government retained the right to vote against their election 
or remove them.80 If the government removed a director, it 
could act to replace him or her with another independent direc-
tor.81  
In the case of Chrysler, the Treasury Department also ne-
gotiated a stockholders agreement providing it the right to ap-
 
 75. OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 57, at 35.  
 76. See COP REPORT, supra note 62, at 3 (suggesting that at least some 
consideration was given to placing these equity interests into an independent 
trust where they would be “insulated from political pressure and government 
interference”). 
 77. Id. at 29 (describing the relatively passive control the government 
maintained over the day-to-day decisions of the companies). 
 78. Id. at 15. 
 79. Stockholders Agreement § 2.2, Oct. 15, 2009, between General Motors 
Holding Company (to be renamed General Motors Company), United States 
Department of the Treasury, 7176384 Canada Inc., UAW Retiree Medical 
Benefits Trust & solely for purposes of Section 6.20, General Motors Company 
(to be converted to General Motors LLC) [hereinafter GM Stockholders 
Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/GM%20Corporate% 
20Docs.pdf. 
 80. For GM, the UAW Trust received one board seat, the Canadian gov-
ernment received one seat, and the U.S. government received ten seats. Id. 
 81. See id. 
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point three of the nine initial directors.82 Two of these directors 
were required to be independent and would pick a third inde-
pendent director.83 In Chrysler’s case, the Treasury Depart-
ment gave up its rights to remove or replace any of these direc-
tors. The independent directors on the board would replace 
them.84 The board was also required to be independent until 
Fiat obtained majority control of the company.85  
In GM’s case, the above arrangements were specifically set 
up to coincide with an initial public offering (IPO) of the com-
pany’s stock.86 The Automotive Task Force negotiated intricate 
governance mechanisms for post-IPO GM, but not Chrysler, 
which further restricted the government’s ability to exercise 
control.87 In the case of GM, the Treasury Department agreed 
to give up the vote on its shares except for key governance mat-
ters after an IPO, election and removal of directors, a sale or 
change of control of the company and any amendment to GM’s 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws affecting such rights.88 
The Voluntary Employee Benefits Association divested itself of 
all voting rights agreeing to vote its shares proportionately 
both before and after an IPO.89 In addition, the agreement pro-
vided for a joint slate nomination process after the IPO with 
the Canadian government in which both the Treasury Depart-
ment and Canadian governments would attempt to jointly nom-
inate directors after the IPO was consummated in proportion to 
their shares owned.90 The Treasury Department also commit-
 
 82. The other directors were appointed as follows: the UAW Trust re-
ceived one board seat, the Canadian government entities one seat, and Fiat 
three seats rising to four seats (and replacing one government entity) when its 
ownership rose to thirty-five percent or above. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative, Chrysler-
Fiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
press-releases/pages/tg115.aspx. 
 83. Draft Form of Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Op-
erating Agreement § 5.3(d), May 12, 2009, New CarCo Acquisition LLC (on file 
with author). 
 84. Id. § 5.3.  
 85. Id. § 5.3(e). 
 86. See GM Stockholders Agreement, supra note 79, § 3.1 (establishing an 
IPO time frame consistent with the requirements mentioned earlier regarding 
board composition). 
 87. See id. (discussing voter agreement requirements).  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. § 4.2(b). 
 90. Id.  
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ted to force GM toward an IPO by July 10, 2010, unless GM 
was already taking reasonable steps to effect one.91  
The government again wielded great political influence 
over GM and Chrysler, both behind the scenes and overtly 
through other means.92 Even before this transaction, the Au-
tomotive Task Force had arranged the resignation of the GM 
and Chrysler CEOs.93 The Treasury Department also put pro-
visions in the automakers’ financing documents to ensure that 
jobs stayed in the United States.94 Similar to what occurred in 
the case of Citigroup, Congress acted overtly to influence the 
automakers and even legislatively reversed the automakers’ at-
tempts to shut down a number of automotive dealerships.95 
Post-investment, both automakers disclosed that they regularly 
consulted with the government on significant decisions.96 In-
deed, the Treasury Department acted under its registration 
rights agreement to cut back the number of shares sold in the 
GM IPO in order to attempt to secure a greater return.97 More-
over, the Treasury Department’s loan agreements contained 
rights to periodic financial information.98 Much of this authori-
 
 91. Id. § 3.1. 
 92. See Micheline Maynard, The Steadfast Optimist Who Oversaw G.M.’s 
Long Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 
5935410 (detailing a specific instance of influence over the automakers). 
 93. See id. (attributing Rick Wagoner’s resignation to heavy pressure from 
the Obama Administration). 
 94. See GM 2008 Loan Agreement, supra note 61 (requiring that the 
agreement be construed in a way that “preserves and promotes the jobs of 
American workers employed directly by [GM] and in related industries”); see 
also RATTNER, supra note 63, at 240–41. 
 95. See William Ehart, Spending Bill Lets Dealers Fight to Regain Chrys-
ler Franchises, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 
25326064. 
 96. See David Shepardson, GM’s Latest Plan Would Cede Control to U.S., 
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 28, 2009, http://detnews.com/article/20090428/AUTO01/ 
904280361/GM-s-latest-plan-would-cede-control-to-U.S; see also Bill Vlasic, In 
G.M.’s Comeback Story, a Pivotal Role Played by Washington, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 21952943. 
 97. Nick Bunkley & Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Is Said to Rein in G.M. 
Stock Offering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 
18994162.  
 98. For the details of these reporting requirements, see generally GM 
2008 Loan Agreement, supra note 61 and GM 2008 December Form 8-K, supra 
note 61. See generally Loan and Security Agreement, Jan. 16, 2009, General 
Motors Corporation and U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury [hereinafter GM 2009 Loan 
Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/Redacted%20LSA% 
20and%20Amendment%20and%20Termination%2001-16-09.pdf; Chrysler 2008 
Loan Agreement, supra note 61. 
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ty, however, apparently originated from the Treasury Depart-
ment rather than other government actors.99 
D. GMAC  
On December 24, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors approved GMAC’s application to become a bank holding 
company.100 In connection with this approval, GMAC received a 
TARP investment under the Automotive Industry Financing 
Program.101 The Treasury Department purchased $5 billion in 
preferred securities with an eight percent dividend and re-
ceived a warrant to purchase preferred equity valued at $250 
million and with a nine percent dividend.102 The Treasury De-
partment also extended GM a loan under the TARP program to 
fund GM’s purchase of up to $1 billion in additional equity in 
GMAC.103 The GMAC investment was a purchase of nonvoting, 
cumulative preferred securities with an interest rate of eight 
percent.104 Like other TARP CPP investments, the Treasury 
Department would only be entitled to appoint two directors 
(managers) of GMAC if the company missed six aggregate divi-
dend payments.105 
In May 2009 the Automotive Task Force restructured the 
Treasury Department’s investment. The Treasury Department 
purchased an additional $7.875 billion in preferred securities in 
 
 99. As GM recovers financially, it has asserted its independence from the 
government, most notably by making the AmeriCredit acquisition against the 
Treasury Department’s wishes. See Josh Kosman, GM Drive-By Deal—
AmeriCredit Acquisition Annoys Feds, N.Y. POST, Sept. 7, 2010, at 25, availa-
ble at 2010 WLNR 17771655.  
 100. See Emily Kaiser, GMAC Gets Fed’s OK to Become a Holding Company, 
REUTERS, Dec. 24, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/ 
24/us-financial-gmac-idUSTRE4BN4BL20081224. 
 101. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces 
TARP Investment in GMAC (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury 
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1335.aspx (announcing the Treasury 
Department’s TARP investment in GMAC). 
 102. See id.  
 103. GM 2009 Loan Agreement, supra note 98. 
 104. Securities Purchase Agreement annex A, Dec. 29, 2008, between 
GMAC LLC & U.S. Department of the Treasury [hereinafter GMAC December 
Investment Terms], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial 
-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Pages/initiatives/financial-stability/investment 
-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/GMAC%20Agreement%20 
Dated%2029%20December%202008.pdf. 
 105. Id. 
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GMAC.106 Part of this sum was provided to allow GMAC to as-
sume the financing obligations of Chrysler Financial.107 After 
this transaction, GMAC renamed itself Ally Financial.108 The 
newly renamed company would provide financial services to 
both GM and Chrysler.109 The Treasury Department also exer-
cised rights it had under its loan to GM to convert this loan into 
a fifty-six percent ownership interest in GMAC (from a pre-
vious thirty-five percent ownership stake).110  
On December 30, 2009, the Treasury Department’s in-
vestment was restructured a third time. The Treasury Depart-
ment purchased an additional $2.54 billion in trust preferred 
securities yielding eight percent and $1.25 billion in mandatory 
convertible preferred securities yielding nine percent which au-
tomatically converted to common stock after seven years.111 At 
the same time, the Treasury Department also converted $3 bil-
lion of its mandatory convertible preferred securities into 
GMAC common stock, which raised its ownership interest to 
56.3 percent.112 The remaining 43.7 percent of GMAC was held 
as follows: 16.6 percent of GMAC remained in the hands of GM, 
which put 9.9 percent of this interest into a trust.113 GM also 
agreed to sell these shares over a three-year period. Cerberus, 
GMAC’s former controlling shareholder held the remaining 
shares, but distributed out 12.2 percent of these shares directly 
to investors in its relevant funds leaving Cerberus with a 14.9 
percent interest.114  
In connection with this third investment, the Treasury De-
partment agreed that it would appoint four of the nine board 
 
 106. Glenn Somerville & Corbett Daly, U.S. Pours $7.5 Billion into Auto 
Lender GMAC, REUTERS, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2009/05/22/us-financial-gmac-capital-idUSTRE54K6NF20090522?feed 
Type=RSS&feedName=businessNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium= 
feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2FbusinessNews+%28News+%2F+US+ 
%2F+Business+News%29. 
 107. Master Transaction Agreement, supra note 71.  
 108. See Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Nathan Becker, Ally to Phase Out GMAC 
Brand Name, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704518904575365273082277584.html. 
 109. Id. 
 110. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE UNIQUE 
TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER THE TARP 43 (2010) [hereinafter GMAC COP 
REPORT]. 
 111. GMAC December Investment Terms, supra note 104, sched. A.  
 112. See GMAC COP REPORT, supra note 110, at 43. 
 113. See id. at 43 n.248. 
 114. Id.  
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members on the GMAC board.115 On December 29, 2009, the 
Treasury Department converted $5.5 billion of the preferred se-
curities to raise its stake in GMAC (now Ally Financial) to 73.8 
percent.116 In connection with this increase in its ownership 
provision, the Ally board of directors was increased to eleven 
members and the Treasury Department became entitled under 
the stockholders agreement to appoint six members of this 
board.117  
There was no independence requirement for these direc-
tors.118 The Cerberus affiliates and management also each des-
ignated one director.119 The remaining directors were required 
to be independent and were designated by the other directors 
with a requirement that at least one Treasury Department 
nominee concur.120 The Treasury Department never established 
a trust to hold and vote the government’s ownership interest, 
despite the government’s earlier intimations. Indeed, the true 
control rights the government asserted over GMAC are un-
known and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) has been 
particularly critical of the Treasury Department’s management 
of this investment.121 
Similar to the GM and Chrysler investments, the govern-
ment also maintained a veto over certain material stockholder 
decisions such as a sale or the issuance of more senior debt or 
 
 115. This right existed so long as the Treasury Department held between 
fifty percent and 70.8 percent of GMAC. If the Treasury Department went 
above this threshold, the board size would increase to eleven members and the 
Department would become entitled to designate six members. See Amended 
and Restated Governance Agreement exhibit 10.2, May 21, 2009, between 
GMAC LLC, FIM Holdings LLC, GM Finance Co. Holdings LLC, and U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury [hereinafter GMAC FIM Agreement], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40729/000119312509117131/dex102.htm. 
 116. Maya Jackson Randall, Treasury Converts $5.5 Billion of Ally Pre-
ferred Stock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704543004576052241726394886.html. 
 117. Ally Financial Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 30, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40729/000119312510291571/d8k.htm. 
 118. See GMAC FIM Agreement, supra note 115, exhibit 10.2 (requiring 
fewer independent managers as the Treasury Department’s ownership in-
creased). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. See GMAC COP REPORT, supra note 110, at 2 (criticizing the “missed 
opportunities” to increase accountability and protect the taxpayer). 
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equity securities.122 Unlike the GM investment in this case, the 
government did not prenegotiate a postinvestment IPO date.123 
E. BANK OF AMERICA 
The Treasury Department’s initial investment in Bank of 
America was a $25 billion purchase of preferred securities in 
connection with its $125 billion investment in the nine largest 
financial institutions.124 Bank of America would come more 
firmly under the government’s foot when it controversially 
agreed to complete its acquisition of Merrill Lynch with the un-
derstanding that it would obtain additional government assis-
tance.125 On January 15, 2009, and after it had acquired Merrill 
Lynch, Bank of America received another $20 billion invest-
ment from the Treasury Department under the TARP Targeted 
Assistance Program.126 The Treasury Department also received 
warrants to purchase 150.3 million shares of Bank of America 
common stock in connection with both investments.127 
The Treasury Department never obtained control rights or 
equity ownership beyond its warrant interests in Bank of 
America. Nonetheless, as with its other investments, the gov-
ernment still wielded great influence. In connection with the 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch, Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Paulson threatened to remove the CEO of Bank of America, 
Ken Lewis, and its board if they attempted to terminate the ac-
quisition.128 This threat came despite Paulson’s lack of regula-
tory authority. Meanwhile, Bank of America’s board was sub-
sequently restructured at the government’s behest and Mr. 
 
 122. GMAC FIM Agreement, supra note 115, at 10. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Mark Landler, U.S. Investing $250 Billion to Bolster Banks; Dow 
Surges 936 Points, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 
19535647. 
 125. David Mildenberg & Bradley Keoun, Bank of America to Acquire Mer-
rill as Crisis Deepens (Update 4), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www 
.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9O9JGOLdI_U. 
 126. David Goldman et al., BofA: $20B Bailout, Huge Merrill Loss, 
CNNMONEY, Jan. 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/16/news/companies/ 
bofa_new_bailout/index.htm?postversion=2009011604. 
 127. Greg Robb, U.S. Makes 1.54 Bln from Bank of America Warrants, 
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-makes 
-154-bln-from-bank-of-america-warrants-2010-03-04-90360. 
 128. See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
124045610029046349.html?KEYWORDS=Lewis+Testifies+US+Urged+Silence+ 
on+Deal (discussing allegations that Mr. Paulson made such a threat). 
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Lewis resigned under government pressure.129 The bank also 
came under special supervision pursuant to a secret memoran-
dum of understanding among the bank, the Office of Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve.130  
F. TARP RECIPIENTS 
The final significant government investment was through 
the CPP. Seven hundred and seven financial institutions even-
tually participated.131 The Treasury Department purchased 
nonconvertible preferred securities at a discounted market rate 
that paid an initial dividend of five percent and a dividend of 
nine percent after five years.132 The Treasury Department also 
received warrants or their equivalent convertible into common 
stock equal to fifteen percent of the value of the investment.133  
The Treasury Department’s control rights were quite lim-
ited. The preferred securities were initially nonvoting, except 
for limited voting rights in cases where more senior securities 
were authorized, the rights of the preferred security holders 
were amended, or the financial institution took any action to 
adversely affect the preferred securities.134 If an issuer missed 
six dividend payments then the government received the right 
to appoint two directors.135 The Treasury Department also ne-
gotiated protective provisions preventing dividends or other 
corporate maneuvers that would deprive the Treasury Depart-
ment of its dividend payment. The preferred securities were re-
deemable by the company but did not contain a put feature al-
lowing the Treasury Department to force the company to 
 
 129. Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank of America Chief Resigns 
Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A1, available at http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB125434715693053835.html?KEYWORDS=Bank+of+America+ 
Chief+Resigns+Under+FireKEYWORDS%3DBank+of+America+Chief+Resigns+ 
Under+Fire.  
 130. Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Seeks Sanction’s End, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 
2010, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487046 
57504575411602370266826.html?KEYWORDS=BofA+seeks+sanction%27s+end. 
 131. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSETS RELIEF PROGRAM 
(TARP): MONTHLY 105(A) REPORT 9 fig.5 (2010) [hereinafter TARP STATUS 
REPORT]. 
 132. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED 
TERMS, TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM: SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK AND 
WARRANTS, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
investment-programs/cpp/Documents/termsheet.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. Id. at 3. 
 135. Id.  
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repurchase the shares.136 The redemption provisions allowed 
for half the warrants to be cancelled if they were redeemed by 
December 31, 2009, and so created an incentive for banks to 
raise private capital before that date if it was economical for 
them to redeem the shares.137  
II.  ASSESSING GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP   
Part I highlighted the diversity of government ownership 
during the financial crisis. No single investment was identical 
in structure or type. This Part sets forth the principles that the 
Bush and Obama Administrations announced to guide govern-
ment ownership and assesses the government’s adherence to 
these principles. It then concludes by critiquing the govern-
ment’s corporate governance arrangements. These investments 
were an economic achievement, but it is questionable whether 
the government’s corporate governance decisions were in the 
public’s best interests.  
A. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRINCIPLES 
1. Ex Ante Structuring Principles 
In the midst of the panic of 2008, the only relevant guide-
lines for government investment were the EESA’s mandate “to 
restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the 
United States” and in doing so to “maximize . . . overall returns 
to the taxpayers of the United States.”138 This mandate was 
loose and subject to interpretation. Initially, the Bush Adminis-
tration adopted no formal policies further outlining its ap-
proach. Officials, including Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, 
would later assert that the government attempted to erect 
commercially negotiated ownership structures.139 As the finan-
 
 136. Id. at 4–5. 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766. The COP would later broadly interpret this mandate 
to include more general economic assistance, forming the basis of the bulk of 
the COP’s criticism of TARP. See Steven M. Davidoff, As TARP Fades, a Look 
at Its Flaws and Its Success, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 17, 2010, 3:26 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/as-tarp-expires-a-look-at-its-flaws-and 
-success/ (discussing these criticisms). 
 139. See HENRY M. PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 307–08, 337–38 (2010) (ex-
plaining why the government preferred a hands-off ownership approach and 
why it chose to invest in preferred stocks rather than simply buying “toxic as-
sets” or common stock, which came with voting rights); RATTNER, supra note 
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cial crisis progressed, the Obama Administration formalized 
these principles in a memorandum written by Diana Ferrell, 
Deputy Director of the National Economic Council. The memo 
advocated the two-stage approach discussed in the introduc-
tion: investments should initially be structured on commercial 
terms; thereafter, the government would take a hands-off 
commercial approach.140  
Then, on March 30, 2009, the Obama White House issued a 
press release in connection with the GM bankruptcy, stating:  
  In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is neces-
sary to respond to a company’s request for substantial assistance, the 
government will reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect 
taxpayers, promote financial stability and encourage growth. When 
necessary, these conditions may include restructurings similar to that 
now underway at GM as well as changes to ensure a strong board of 
directors that selects management with a sound long-term vision to 
restore their companies to profitability and to end the need for gov-
ernment support as quickly as is practically feasible.141 
The GM press release was the first time the government 
had publicly announced any policy with respect to the prein-
vestment structuring of its financial crisis investments. The re-
lease also marked a reversion from the commercial approach 
officials initially described.142 Instead of commercial arrange-
ments, the GM press release asserted that the government’s 
goals were to “protect taxpayers, promote financial stability 
and encourage growth.”143 None of these involved commercial 
terms in the investment itself; instead, these were general 
goals consistent with the government’s desire to act in ways 
benefitting the entire economy rather than any individual com-
pany. The only wealth-maximizing statement with respect to 
the actual investments was to the effect that the government’s 
goal was to “restore their companies to profitability and to end 
the need for government support as quickly as is practically 
feasible.”144 In other words, the government was more interest-
ed in exiting these investments promptly than in earning a re-
 
63, at 132 (quoting President Obama as stating he wanted Chrysler assistance 
to be “tough” and “commercial”). 
 140. ALTER, supra note 63, at 184. 
 141. Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2; see also 
OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 57, at 42 (listing the government’s 
four “principles to guide its actions as a common shareholder”). 
 142. Cf. PAULSON, supra note 139 (describing the initial desire for a com-
mercial approach). 
 143. Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2. 
 144. Id. 
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turn. For example, the instrument for the AIG trust referred 
only to the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department be-
ing repaid their investments; it did not mention a return.145  
This press release was in reality a statement of the prin-
ciples the Bush and Obama Administrations followed even 
prior to that time when structuring their investments. The gov-
ernment did periodically operate as a commercial actor. The 
AIG bailout was modeled on a privately negotiated financial 
assistance package.146 The government’s private commercial 
aspirations, though, were often superseded by public considera-
tions. For example, the CPP program extended preferred fi-
nancing to the financial sector on generous terms in order to 
foster financial stability.147  
The Treasury Department and other government agencies 
did largely adhere to the Bush and Obama Administrations’ 
commitment to restructure management and boards of direc-
tors. The CEOs of AIG, Chrysler, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
General Motors, and GMAC were all replaced in connection 
with the government’s investment.148 The boards of all of these 
companies, as well as Bank of America’s and Citigroup’s, were 
also significantly restructured.149 In particular, the government 
encouraged the appointment of strong board chairmen as a 
 
 145. See AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18 (outlining the nonbinding 
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that the voting power of the 
“Trust Stock” should be exercised with an eye toward benefitting the public). 
 146. See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 7, at 964 (describing the package in de-
tail). Fannie and Freddie were also designed to mimic a commercial transac-
tion although the government did not attempt to wipe out the GSE’s senior- 
preferred stockholders or secured debt for political and economic reasons.  
 147. See René M. Stulz & Luigi Zingalees, The Financial Crisis: Comments 
and Discussion an Inside View, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 
1, 67 (2009); Lei Li, TARP Funds Distribution and Bank Loan Growth, 7 (June 
21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515349 (“To encourage banks to participate in CPP, 
the Treasury made the terms of CPP investments quite attractive.”). 
 148. See Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, GMAC Chief Ousted by Board, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704538404574540032497128084.html (reporting the firing of 
GMAC CEO Alvaro de Molina); supra notes 27–28, 92 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Eric Dash, As It Works to Find Its Stride and Renew Confidence, 
Citigroup Shuffles Its Board, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at B3, available at 
2010 WLNR 4145189; Stephen Labaton & Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Rescue 
Seen at Hand for Two Mortgage Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at A1, 
available at 2008 WL 16910682; supra notes 23–25, 76–81, 105, 118 and ac-
companying text. 
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counterweight to the CEO influence.150 The government did at 
times act politically and less than effectively in these restruc-
turings—particularly with the automakers. But in large part 
the government acted in accordance with its principles to re-
place and restructure the companies in which it made signifi-
cant investments.  
The government’s failure to negotiate full commercial 
terms resulted in significantly diminished returns on its in-
vestments.151 In particular, the Treasury Department generally 
eschewed taking equity in institutions.152 It only did so in ex-
treme circumstances or if the post-investment capital structure 
of the company could not tolerate other securities.153 The TARP 
warrant requirements were only inserted at the insistence of 
Congress.154 Some investments such as those in Bank of Ameri-
ca and Chrysler Financial were deliberately structured so that 
the government did not take an equity interest.155 Consequent-
 
 150. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, G.M. Chairman Vows to Defend Market Share, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 15091209 (detailing 
the objectives of GM’s board, over half of which was chosen by the government, 
and which aimed to get the company’s management to repay the U.S. taxpay-
ers for their financial assistance); Alistair Barr, AIG CEO Wins Power Struggle 
as Chairman Resigns, MARKETWATCH, July 15, 2010, http://www.marketwatch 
.com/story/aig-gets-new-chairman-golub-resigns-after-spat-2010-07-15 (detail-
ing the conflicts between AIG’s chairman and CEO). 
 151. Jeffrey McCracken et al., Chrysler Financial’s Value Jumped 33% Af-
ter U.S. Exit, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 22, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2010-12-22/chrysler-financial-value-jumped-33-after-u-s-exit-cerberus 
-s-sale-shows.html. 
 152. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Depart-
ment Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner to Hill Leadership on 
Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP (Dec. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Dep’t of 
the Treasury Press Release], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
press-releases/Pages/tg433.aspx. 
 153. In cases such as Bank of America and Chrysler Financial the govern-
ment deliberately decided to avoid an equity stake. See supra note 75 and ac-
companying text (Chrysler), and supra note 128 and accompanying text (Bank 
of America). 
 154. 154 CONG. REC. H10712-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Barney Frank). Congress also directed the Treasury Department not to vote 
with any stock it may acquire, pursuant to these warrants. See Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 113(d)(1)(A), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3778. 
 155. In the case of Chrysler Financial, the Treasury Department extended 
a TARP Automotive Industry Financing Program loan on January 16, 2009, 
for $1.5 billion. The mandatory warrants issued in connection with this trans-
action, however, were for additional notes to be issued by the special purpose 
vehicle. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces 
TARP in Chrysler Financial (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.treasury 
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1362.aspx. 
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ly, when the market rebounded, the government did not reap as 
significant gains as it otherwise could have.156  
The Treasury Department’s “regulation by deal” approach 
also encouraged drift from purer commercial principles.157 Each 
investment was negotiated as a unique enterprise due to differ-
ing legal, political, and commercial factors.158 This approach 
was partly unavoidable due to the circumstances of the rescue 
and the government’s limited statutory authority. But it en-
couraged an excessive amount of dealmaking—dealmaking that 
provided the government latitude to bestow private benefits to 
stakeholders and outside parties.159 
Despite the heterogeneous nature of its investments and 
the implementation problems described above, the government 
largely met its self-announced goal to “encourage financial sta-
bility.”160 These investments were part of a broader program 
that succeeded in halting the financial panic.161 The govern-
ment’s success in meeting these principles was largely due to 
their definitional breadth. These successes say nothing of the 
legitimacy of the underlying principles.  
2. Ex Post Facto Structuring Principles 
The government adopted principles to govern its conduct 
after its investments as well.162 In these circumstances, the 
government took great pains to forfeit control over these corpo-
rate enterprises. In its monthly TARP reports the Treasury 
Department regularly reiterated that it would vote its shares 
only with respect to the election or removal of directors and 
other significant matters, but would otherwise abstain from 
voting.163 
This policy was largely in line with the post-investment 
principles that the Treasury Department annunciated when it 
 
 156. McCracken et al., supra note 151. 
 157. See infra notes 205–31. 
 158. See, e.g., RATTNER, supra note 63, at 120–23.  
 159. See Steven M. Davidoff, Valuing Ally Financial, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 3, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/ 
valuing-ally-financial/ (discussing how different government actions might have 
resulted in large benefits for taxpayers rather than private investors). 
 160. See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.  
 161. See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2 
(articulating standards for the Treasury Department’s conduct post-acquisition). 
 163. TARP STATUS REPORT, supra note 131, at 23; see also Dep’t of the 
Treasury Press Release, supra note 152. 
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announced the GM bankruptcy. At that time, the Treasury De-
partment stated: 
  After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will 
protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its ownership stake in 
a hands-off, commercial manner. The government will not interfere 
with or exert control over day-to-day company operations. No gov-
ernment employees will serve on the boards or be employed by these 
companies.164 
In practice, the government, including the Treasury De-
partment, surpassed these principles. In its AIG, Bank of 
America, Chrysler, Citigroup, GM, and GMAC investments, the 
government deliberately ceded even more control than this pol-
icy envisioned.165  
In some measure, the varying approaches were due to the 
government’s shifting policies as the financial crisis progressed 
and presidential Administrations changed. The Bush Adminis-
tration settled upon and implemented the complete forfeiture of 
control in the case of AIG.166 It was also the only ownership in-
terest held by the Federal Reserve. But this policy changed at 
some point. The Obama Administration’s Treasury Department 
refrained from the use of trust mechanisms and otherwise re-
tained the right to appoint directors in instances where it ob-
tained majority control.167 Even then, however, the Obama 
Administration adopted mechanisms to deprive it of majority 
control in the case of GMAC.168 The government’s aversion to 
control thus continued throughout the financial crisis.  
Why did the Treasury Department take such extreme 
steps? Why did it even feel the need to divest itself of control at 
all? The government never directly answered these questions, 
and the subject is a topic for an entire book.169 The summary 
answer likely involves a mixture of ideological, political, and 
practical rationales. First, we live in a society that almost uni-
formly understands itself as capitalist.170 Whether or not one 
 
 164. Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2. 
 165. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1 (discussing government 
attempts to handle the effects of the financial crisis). 
 166. The trust instrument specifically stated that it was established “to 
avoid any possible conflict with [the New York Fed’s] supervisory and mone-
tary policy functions.” AIG Trust Agreement, supra note 18. 
 167. See Black, supra note 5, at 592 (explaining that the Treasury Depart-
ment only acquired the right to appoint four of nine directors). 
 168. See Verret, supra note 4, at 295–96. 
 169. See generally RATTNER, supra note 63, passim. 
 170. “Capitalism” Not So Sacred to Americans as Mood Sours, BUS. WK., 
July 13, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-13/-capitalism-not 
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believes that state ownership of enterprise can legitimately ex-
ist in a capitalist environment, the American public defines 
capitalism in a manner that excluded this possibility.171 Under 
most political theories, the Bush and Obama Administrations 
were incentivized to cater to a viewpoint held by almost all in-
terest groups.172 Conservative commentators repeatedly tagged 
the Obama Administration in particular with the mantra of so-
cialism.173 By committing to quickly dispose of these entities 
and exercise little control, the Obama Administration could at-
tempt to dispel this stigma.  
Second, the government’s position also had a real wealth-
maximizing benefit. The government’s position limited undue, 
wealth-destroying political influence beyond the Treasury De-
partment and presidential administration.174 It also jibed with 
the apparent economic beliefs of Henry Paulson, Timothy 
Geithner, and Larry Summers that these businesses should not 
be politicized.175 Indeed, Geithner and Summers adopted this 
ethos during the currency and country financial crises of the 
1990s.176 The specter of politicization in the financial crisis was 
a real threat as politicians repeatedly attempted to influence or 
act legislatively to operate these entities.177 Market actors also 
appeared to view the government’s forfeiture of control as re-
 
-so-sacred-to-americans-as-mood-sours.html (noting that seventy percent of 
Americans support free enterprise and free markets). 
 171. See Anthony Faiola, The End of American Capitalism?, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 10, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/10/09/AR2008100903425.html (noting the intensely hands-off ap-
proach of government in American capitalism). 
 172. Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, 
and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1373, 1414 (2007) (noting that due to our political process, interest 
groups can “capture” elected officials). 
 173. See, e.g., Glenn Beck: Barack Obama, Socialist? (Fox News television 
broadcast Apr. 6, 2010) (“But if you’re into redistribution of wealth, I’m sorry, 
but that is a Marxist principle . . . . Marx said that. Madison never said that. 
Our Founders all warned against that. They didn’t think it was better to 
‘spread the wealth around.’”), transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,590532,00.html. 
 174. See Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2. 
 175. Cf. ROBERT RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: 
TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 14–16 (2003) (expressing 
surprise about political opposition to assisting Mexico during its financial crisis). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Verret, supra note 4, at 296 (“[T]he President’s Auto Task Force de-
termined that Chrysler’s restructuring plan was not likely to permit it to 
emerge from bankruptcy, and pressured Chrysler to arrange a merger deal 
with Fiat.”). 
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storing faith in the troubled companies and in capitalism gen-
erally.178  
In contrast to the mixed adherence to its control principles, 
the government rigorously followed its stated goal to quickly 
(as soon as practicable) disentangle itself from the private sec-
tor. At the time of this writing, the government has already 
disposed of its Citigroup shares and orchestrated an initial pub-
lic offering for GM.179 In addition, the Federal Reserve and 
Treasury Department effectively encouraged financial institu-
tions to repay TARP money as soon as possible.180 The Treas-
ury Department struggled mightily to end its other programs 
with similar haste.181 Though the calculation is uncertain, it 
appears that this effort diminished the returns the government 
otherwise could have received from its investments.182 This 
headlong rush to dispose of these interests was again a product 
of the same factors that led the government to deliberately fore-
go control over its investments.183  
B. ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENT’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The Treasury Department and other government agencies 
adopted a bifurcated approach to corporate governance. At the 
time of its investment, the government repeatedly acted to re-
move and replace executives and restructure boards of direc-
tors.184 Afterwards, the government took great pains to divest 
itself of day-to-day control, or even any direct control.185  
The government’s approach appeared to be successful. It 
largely exited from these investments with an economic return, 
 
 178. Clare Baldwin & Soyoung Kim, GM Shares Lose Momentum in Post-
IPO NYSE Return, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2010/11/18/us-gm-ipo-idUSTRE6AB43H20101118?pageNumber=2 
(noting that the GM IPO points toward renewed confidence in the industry). 
 179. Michael de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of 
G.M. Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 
22969625. 
 180. Edmund L. Andrews, Calling on Big Banks to Repay Bailout Now, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 20328304. 
 181. See Michael J. de la Merced, Picking Up Pieces of the Bailout Stock Sale 
Action, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 4, 2011, 4:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes 
.com/2011/02/04/picking-up-pieces-of-the-bailout-stock-sale-action/?src=dlbksb. 
 182. See McCracken et al., supra note 151. 
 183. See supra notes 165–79 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Sterngold & Christie, supra note 24.  
 185. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1 (discussing government 
attempts to handle the effects of the financial crisis). 
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and the companies themselves returned to profit. For example, 
the government has made $22 billion on the $85 billion it in-
vested in AIG during the financial crisis.186 The net loss from 
the entire TARP program is currently estimated by the COP to 
be $66 billion.187 Compare these figures to some early predic-
tions that the United States would lose the $700 billion initial 
EESA investment commitment and be required to expend addi-
tional sums to alleviate the financial and banking crisis.188 In 
addition, the Treasury Department obtained more money than 
it invested with respect to Bank of America, Citigroup, and the 
707 CPP recipients on the whole.189 With respect to AIG, GM, 
and GMAC, the government is likely to recover near its total 
investment. Chrysler is an unknown at this time but is likely to 
result in a significant loss. The real aggregate loss from these 
investments is probably, at worst, less than one percent of the 
gross domestic product of the nation.190 This is a small sum to 
pay to halt a running financial panic and credit crisis.  
The Treasury Department’s ex ante restructurings were ef-
fective,191 but it remains unknown how these post-transaction 
structures worked in actuality. The governance mechanics of 
these entities and the government’s interaction with the com-
pany’s management and boards remain largely undisclosed. We 
must await the historians and journalists to write a record of 
what occurred behind the scenes to definitively assess how the 
Treasury Department’s corporate governance decisions func-
tioned. In particular, without knowledge of the internal work-
ings of these companies during that time, we do not know the 
impact of the administrations’ soft control of these investments. 
 
 186. Editorial, Our View on TARP: Hated Bank Bailout Is About to Turn a 
Profit, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
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 190. See Sewell Chan, In Study, 2 Economists Say Intervention Helped 
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The Treasury Department may have been so willing to give up 
direct control because it still exercised significant force behind 
the scenes.192 We do not yet know how the deliberations played 
out within each administration.  
Assessments are also difficult because the Treasury De-
partment’s negotiated governance mechanisms were divergent 
in practice.193 While it is clear that issues arose with unique 
companies and particularly AIG, it is still unknown if any par-
ticular control mechanism worked better than others. In other 
words, and with respect to the government’s significant in-
vestments: did the trust mechanism provide greater “space” to 
AIG to restructure and perform on a more economical basis 
than independent directors? When independent directors were 
appointed, did this mechanic work better when the government 
appointed a majority of these directors or when more commer-
cial investors were present, as in the case of Fiat and the 
Chrysler board? Even once more information about these gov-
ernance mechanisms becomes available, our comparative as-
sessment will be hampered because these divergent arrange-
ments were never truly tested.  
There are some indicia that the government was able to 
assert effective restructurings through soft control and through 
its independent director and trustee governance mechan-
isms.194 The government’s lack of formal control also served to 
be a useful political device to provide cover for the govern-
ment’s actions or inaction with respect to these companies.195  
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This lack of control, but continued ownership, nonetheless 
imposed its own costs. For example, AIG executives at times 
adopted an us-versus-them approach. The general counsel of 
AIG attempted to organize a mass executive resignation to pro-
test the TARP compensation requirements.196 Employees at 
other firms such as Citigroup also often took public stands 
against the government.197 It also appears that the govern-
ment’s lack of direct control and power over executive compen-
sation allowed these entities to pay undue amounts to their 
employees at the government’s expense.198 Failure to exercise 
control meant that in many cases government policies, such as 
home ownership and small business loan programs, were not 
implemented to the full extent the government may have 
wished.199 In other cases, it meant that these corporate enter-
prises failed to take business decisions the government other-
wise viewed as commercially preferable.200  
The success or failure of the government’s approach was 
never truly publicly tested. Instead, the economic upturn 
caused by other government programs and the Treasury De-
partment’s quick exit from the majority of these enterprises 
meant that the government never was directly opposed by the 
boards of these companies. The government’s corporate govern-
ance mechanisms were largely untested. Nonetheless, the quick 
exit of many companies from government ownership provides 
some evidence and a caveated conclusion that the government’s 
approach to control functioned to its stated effect.201  
The evidence is more robust with respect to the govern-
ment’s more commercial pre-ownership restructurings than its 
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continued ex ante operation and ownership of these companies. 
The government may have signaled its own dissatisfaction with 
its corporate governance arrangements in its 2010 restructur-
ings of AIG and GMAC. In the case of AIG, the Treasury De-
partment abandoned trust and independent director mechan-
isms in favor of direct control.202 Similarly, at the end of 2010 
the Treasury Department raised its stake in GMAC and ob-
tained the right to appoint a majority of GMAC’s directors 
without an independence requirement.203  
III.  LESSONS FOR FUTURE GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP   
The government’s ownership experience resulted in a rela-
tively small economic loss.204 But as noted in Part II, this suc-
cess—due in significant part to other government actions—may 
have otherwise obscured defects in the government’s approach. 
This Part attempts to draw some lessons from the ownership 
experience. Part III first discusses the theoretical implications 
of the government’s ownership experience and then turns to 
more practical lessons. 
A. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
THEORY 
The economic and political literature on state-owned en-
terprises is thick, but it is almost exclusively devoted to long-
term, intentional ownership of private entities.205 In the finan-
cial crisis, ownership—forced unwillingly on the government—
was episodic. Theoretical observations are thus more aptly con-
fined to dealmaking and corporate design. In the dealmaking 
realm, the government structured one-off solutions to each en-
terprise, negotiating agreements within the law and the prior 
contractual arrangements that bound the parties.206  
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Corporate design in the financial crisis was a different 
beast than ordinary, private models of investment.207 Theoriz-
ing about this ownership within existing corporate archetypes 
is difficult.208 The government’s ownership during the financial 
crisis simply did not fit exclusively within any existing corpo-
rate ownership typology.209 Nor did the government’s owner-
ship model fit within a corporatism or director primacy frame-
work.210  
The government asserted that it acted akin to a private 
equity firm in adopting hands-off governance models post-
investment.211 But private equity firms are defined by the con-
trol they assert post-acquisition through which they eliminate 
many of the agency costs associated with public, dispersed 
ownership.212 The government may have acted like a private 
equity firm prior to obtaining control, but its forfeiture of post-
ownership control instead appears to be more akin to an insti-
tutional investor. Like an institutional investor, the govern-
ment relied on extrinsic market forces and norms to ensure 
that it could continue to exert control over these entities after 
acquisition of ownership.213  
The analogy with an institutional investor also breaks 
down though, because the government did not have the same 
exit potential as these investors. If the institutional investor 
disagrees with management, it typically has the option of sell-
ing its investment in the public market.214 The government did 
not have this alternative, at least at the time it made these in-
vestments. In some cases, the entities in which the government 
invested were private, which eliminated a public-sale option al-
together.215 But even for investments in public companies, the 
government was effectively barred from selling its stakes dur-
ing the financing crisis. The sale of a significant stake (or even 
a small stake) in a public entity like Citigroup would likely 
 
 207. Verret, supra note 4, at 285.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. ALTER, supra note 63, at 184. 
 212. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 1, at 539. 
 213. See id. at 538–40. 
 214. Black, supra note 5, at 585 (noting government sales of private stocks). 
 215. Id. at 573; see also Aaron Elstein, Largest U.S. Privately Held Bank 
Still Hasn’t Paid Back TARP Loan, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 28, 2010, at 18, 
available at 2010 WLNR 4498809. 
  
2011] GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 1769 
 
have spurred further market distress, thus undermining the 
very purpose of the government’s investments.216  
In the private context, comparisons with institutional in-
vestor governance are less appropriate due to the government’s 
reliance on independent directors.217 In the public sphere, inde-
pendent directors are increasingly the norm as well as a regu-
latory requirement under stock exchange rules.218 However, the 
same market pressures which act as a force on independent di-
rectors in public companies are absent in the private sphere.219 
There are no stockholder activists, analysts, stock price move-
ments, or ratings agencies for a private company.  
The government at times also acted like a venture capital-
ist.220 A venture capitalist often foregoes direct governance 
rights but exercises power through the ability to withhold later, 
necessary capital.221 Though the government’s investments 
were initially structured along these lines, the government 
subsequently attempted to invest on the assumption that no 
further capital would be needed.222 Part of the reason why the 
government was forced to continuously restructure many in-
vestments was that each one was structured as a complete and 
final investment. When circumstances changed, the govern-
ment lacked the flexibility to adjust its investments without en-
tirely restructuring them.223  
Government corporate ownership during the crisis ulti-
mately did not fit neatly into any single-investor model.224 Gov-
ernment ownership also did not fit within any unifying theory 
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of corporate governance.225 In the initial stages of the financial 
crisis, some theorists postulated that the government had tak-
en a corporatist turn.226 The state had entered a new era of 
progressivism, using its power and influence to direct and 
shape corporations. However, the government deliberately de-
prived itself of its corporatist overtones through its formal own-
ership arrangements.227 It may have exercised a measure of 
control through soft and regulatory-supervisory powers, but in 
its contractual arrangements the government divested itself of 
control.228 Even this exercise of indirect control was a direct 
product of the financial crisis and accompanying panic. As the 
crisis and panic dissipated, companies’ reliance on the govern-
ment for survival faded, and the Treasury Department’s ability 
to interfere with companies diminished.229 Corporatism may 
have thrived in other areas of the U.S. economy during this 
time, but in the arena of government ownership it was a fleet-
ing affair.230 
Nor does the government’s conduct provide significant 
support for the director primacy model.231 The Treasury De-
partment utilized independent directors to govern its corporate 
investments.232 In its main formulation, the efficacy of this 
theory relies on the forces of public markets to hold directors 
accountable. These forces did not exist for the government’s 
main investments.233 The Treasury Department’s control struc-
 
 225. Id. at 540 (“[T]he government’s deals looked quite different from tradi-
tional privately negotiated deals.”). 
 226. See William W. Bratton & Michael Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 
99, 103 (2008) (“Corporatism implies a radical restatement of the purpose of 
the business corporation . . . . But it does this only at the threshold, the point 
at which corporations come to the state-directed table where the groups de-
termine the public interest.”). 
 227. See Press Release, General Motors Restructuring, supra note 2. 
 228. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
 229. See, e.g., Josh Kosman, GM’s AmeriCredit Acquisition Irks Feds, N.Y. 
POST, Sep. 7, 2010, at 25, available at 2010 WLNR 17771655. 
 230. See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL (2011) (dis-
cussing the corporatist nature of the Dodd-Frank reforms).  
 231. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“[D]irector primacy 
claims that shareholders are the appropriate beneficiaries of director fiduciary 
duties. Hence, director accountability for maximizing shareholder wealth re-
mains an important component of director primacy.”). 
 232. Black, supra note 5, at 569. 
 233. Chrysler, GM, and GMAC all became privately held companies. See 
Verret, supra note 4, at 295. 
  
2011] GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 1771 
 
tures or lack thereof were also never tested. Its performance is 
thus at best an endorsement—rather than a validation—of in-
dependent directors.  
Despite the lack of validation for corporatist and director 
primacy governance theories, the government’s ownership pro-
vides measured support for a social norms theory of corporate 
governance. Jonathan Macey argues that what we often call fi-
duciary duties do not have the force of law.234 Rather, they are 
simply promises which are kept and enforced through social 
norms.235 The government may have forfeited formal control 
because it could still exert sufficient control through the board’s 
adherence to norms.236 These norms themselves may have been 
strengthened due to the presence of the government and no-
tions of civic duty associated with it.237 It appears that the gov-
ernment was relying more on a “norms” theory of board govern-
ance than a director primacy one.  
In the wake of the financial crisis, the effectiveness of these 
norms remains unclear. Reports arose of dissension among the 
AIG board and its executives against government control.238 
Citigroup and other entities rushed to remove themselves from 
TARP executive compensation restrictions.239 GM referred to 
its need to escape government ownership and its nickname of 
“Government Motors” for commercial purposes.240 The Admin-
istration expressed frustration with the management of Bank 
of America and Citigroup about their lending practices.241 
Without more information about the internal workings of the 
company’s governance, however, the best we can conclude at 
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this point was that the efficacy of reliance on norms for corpo-
rate governance in these circumstances is uncertain, and again 
the government’s conduct was an endorsement of this theory 
more than a validation of it.  
Ultimately, the government’s ownership was a cobbling to-
gether of different models of governance, structures which var-
ied depending upon the particular investment. In some cases, 
the government acted in line with the venture capital model by 
ensuring governance compliance through rounds of capital.242 
At other times the government veered toward the private equi-
ty model through its ex ante corporate restructurings.243 Still 
other times the government adopted a hands-off approach as an 
institutional investor would.244 The government also relied on 
the soft power it could assert through lending, as well as its 
regulatory authority, to maintain the potential for control over 
its investments.  
B. LESSONS OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN THE 
MIDST OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The lessons of government ownership in the recent crisis 
are best characterized as general principles, not detailed guide-
lines or rules. The nature of the next financial crisis is inher-
ently uncertain.245 This reality means that the government is 
likely to require flexibility in structuring any investment. The 
particular features of individual corporations as well as legal 
limitations in effect at the time will also force the government 
to diverge in the structure of its investment. Broad principles 
are thus more appropriate rather than rigid rules.246  
Government ownership of private enterprise is historically 
rare.247 Before the current bout of ownership, there were few 
prior examples in the post-World War II era. The government 
investment in Chrysler was the most prominent.248 Also nota-
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ble were the assistance the FDIC provided to Continental Illi-
nois and the liquidation and work-out authority the Resolution 
Trust Corporation established.249 The government apparently 
did not rely on those experiences to structure its current own-
ership bout—notwithstanding some similarities.250  
Government ownership is likely to continue to remain rare 
for both legal and political reasons. Legally, the government is 
restricted in its ability to own private companies.251 The Gov-
ernment Corporation Control Act of 1945 requires congression-
al authorization for the government to own private compa-
nies.252 The Act is one reason why the government initially 
utilized a trust mechanism to hold the AIG interest.253 The new 
financial reform bill also limits the ability of the Federal Re-
serve to use its section 13(3) power in the manner it did during 
the financial crisis to provide financial assistance to compa-
nies.254 It is thus difficult for the government to find a statutory 
hook on which to hang authority to own private enterprise. 
This does not mean that government ownership of private 
enterprise will not reoccur. It will instead take a crisis and the 
forces it creates to push the government to stretch the law or 
congressional authorization to justify future ownership.255 But 
either case is apt to occur only in exigent circumstances.256 
Ownership is therefore not only likely to be extraordinary due 
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to the political atmosphere, but also because the law makes 
such ownership difficult.257 There is thus no need at this point 
to wade into the debate about whether government ownership 
is ever appropriate, and if so, under what circumstances it is 
justified. The question of when the government should take 
ownership (rather than how it should govern once it obtains 
ownership) is left for another article.  
With these caveats in mind, several lessons from govern-
ment ownership can be distilled. The Obama Administration’s 
principles were largely implemented as announced, and effec-
tive as implemented.258 The government’s resort to commercial 
principles to guide its ex ante investment structures was ap-
propriate and economically beneficial to the government and 
the nation.259 The Treasury Department did not always remain 
true to these commercial principles—particularly in its post-
investment governance structures.260 More often than not, 
though, these principles guided the Treasury Department’s ac-
tions.261 In future government investment, resort to commercial 
principles is, absent full nationalization, likely to provide the 
greatest benefit to the government and the nation and to en-
sure the continued viability of these corporate enterprises.262 
These principles should apply both pre and postinvestment.  
A commercial touchstone is a normative device designed to 
frame optimal outcomes. It is the better initial principle be-
cause it provides an objective measure for this investment, and 
ensures that the investment is wealth maximizing to the nation 
as a whole and possibly on an individual basis.263 By implemen-
tation of commercial principles the government ensures that 
the investment is a net gain for both the country and for indi-
vidual investors.264 A commercial approach also limits private 
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benefits by ensuring a return similar to what a commercial in-
vestor would reap.265 Moreover, consistent with the beliefs of 
key officials such as Timothy Geithner and Larry Summers, it 
ensures that the businesses are not politicized.266 The Treasury 
Department’s application of these principles in its preinvest-
ment restructurings illustrates how commercial principles can 
ensure valid government investments.  
The main observable defects in the government’s approach 
lay in three areas. The government (1) failed to negotiate terms 
and structure its investments to ensure an appropriate com-
mercial-like return,267 (2) unduly forfeited and limited its con-
trol rights post-investment,268 and (3) allowed excess private 
benefits to accrue to outside parties.269  
The Treasury Department’s failure to negotiate terms that 
could yield returns commensurate with a commercial transac-
tion can be explained in part by political and economic consid-
erations.270 The Treasury Department, however, often either 
eschewed taking equity or structured its investments to avoid 
acquiring control.271 Even in less intrusive investment pro-
grams when control was not a factor, such as the CPP, the 
Treasury Department provided generous terms for its financ-
ing.272 The Department’s failure to negotiate full commercial 
terms resulted in reduced returns.273 This failure appears to be 
attributable to the Bush and Obama Administrations’ desire to 
avoid control due to the political optics of government owner-
ship.274 The Treasury Department’s aversion to control and pri-
vate ownership also led to accusations that it disposed of the 
government’s investments too quickly—further reducing the 
government’s return on its investments.275 This charge was 
made in the case of Citigroup and the CPP program. In both 
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cases, the government would have earned greater returns had 
it held onto its investments only six months to a year longer.276  
If control was the government’s problem, the Treasury De-
partment itself revealed an alternative approach to managing 
this problem. Rather than forfeit equity, privately negotiated 
stockholders agreements can function to delimit control.277 Al-
ternatively, the Treasury Department could have acquired eq-
uity through warrants providing it with the same measure of 
return but without the voting and ownership interests of equi-
ty. The problem of equity (and the control that goes with it) is 
thus manageable through private ordering. The government 
should address the problem of control in the future through 
these mechanisms rather than through equity forfeitures. The 
government should invest and acquire equity as a commercial 
actor would do in any distressed investment.  
The Treasury Department still appeared to unduly limit its 
control. Soft power and other corporate governance mechan-
isms may provide potential for sufficient control, but this is 
again an unknown. True control through the appointment of 
board members is a more significant check on a corporation’s 
actions. While soft control may often suffice, in situations 
where the size of the government’s stake warrants control—
majority or near majority ownership—the government should 
negotiate the ability to freely remove and replace its appointed 
directors. This level of control would provide a back-up route to 
exert control over the enterprise. In such situations, there 
should also be a tendency to take majority control if the in-
vestment warrants it. In other scenarios where majority control 
is not acquired, the government should exercise the control that 
accompanies less significant investments. Loan agreements 
should be negotiated with appropriate covenants and preferred 
share arrangements, which have quasi-market terms as to gov-
ernance.  
There remains the question of the efficacy of the govern-
ment’s alternative approach: independent directors. Independ-
ent directors may have been effective, though this is ultimately 
unknowable. The use of independent directors also avoided is-
sues raised by others as to a conflict of fiduciary duties between 
the directors and the government and possible litigation.278 But 
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this appears to be an issue of low risk given that state courts 
are unlikely to interfere with any government arrangement.279 
Ultimately, while the means to replace these directors was val-
uable, the same forces that exert power on these directors in 
the public sphere may not have existed.280 
The government’s failure to fully exercise control and ac-
quire equity reallocated this wealth to private actors. If the 
government had implemented its investments in a purely 
commercial manner these benefits would have been reduced, 
particularly in the case of the automakers and GMAC.281 The 
corollary, of course, is that these benefits would have accrued to 
the investor—the American public. While some private benefits 
are inevitable in this type of government intervention, the con-
sequence during the financial crisis was not only reduced gov-
ernment benefits but public backlash against the government’s 
program. The willingness of the Bush and Obama Administra-
tions to tolerate this wealth allocation in connection with the 
government ownership spurred passionate popular discontent 
with the economic rescue package and provided significant 
ammunition to critics of both Administrations.282 If there is a 
principle to be derived here, it is that not only should private 
benefits be limited to ensure an economic return for the public, 
but that perception also matters. The government should, in 
the future, limit these benefits not only in adherence to com-
mercial principles but also for political necessity.  
  CONCLUSION   
A fish in the midst of the ocean is unable to discern that it 
is in water or even wet.283 We are still at sea amidst the finan-
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cial crisis, and like fish we lack the perspective to make defini-
tive assessments of the government’s financial crisis ownership 
until significant time has passed. The true lessons of govern-
ment ownership are thus left to history. Still, this Article has 
attempted to highlight possible defects in the government’s 
ownership experience as well as to draw early lessons. The 
Treasury Department and other government agencies may 
have appropriately relied on soft and alternative governance 
forces to forfeit some level of control over its corporate invest-
ments. These agencies likely went too far, however, in forfeiting 
ultimate control over these enterprises. These defects must be 
set against the backdrop that the government’s investments 
were largely repaid on an aggregate basis. This is a significant 
accomplishment. It is a success which should be acknowledged. 
 
Thickens (April 14, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/warsh20080414a.htm.  
